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SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
AFTER MAISYSTEMS v. PEAK COMPUTER
Trfinnie Arriola
Abstract: In MA/ Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that Peak committed copyright infringement by running MAI operating system
software incidental to Peak's repair of the computer system. The court rejected Peak's section
117 defense under the Copyright Act because it refused to recognize a licensee of computer
software as an "owner" of a copy of software. This Note argues that the decision contravenes
both the substance and principles of federal copyright law, and unnecessarily harms computer
owners. It suggests a two-tiered analysis that courts should follow when evaluating copyright
infringement claims involving software licensing agreements and third parties.

In MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.' the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that a third party's unauthorized act of loading
copyrighted software into the Random Access Memory (RAM)2 in order
to repair a computer system constituted copyright infringement under the
1976 Copyright Act (the Act).' By refusing to evaluate the infringement
claim under section 117 of the Act4 and failing to consider the fair use
exemption,5 the court elected an approach with unpredictable and unfair
consequences. The decision provides manufacturers with a patent-like
monopoly over the use and maintenance of the computer upon which
such software operates. As a result, the decision protects copyright
holders' interests at the expense of software users' rights, and thus
undermines the goals of the Copyright Act.
The MAI Systems court reached a flawed decision lacking any cogent
rationale or supporting public policy. The court's cursory dismissal of
section 117's applicability, based upon its interpretation of "owner,"
inappropriately restricts rights that computer users have long taken for
granted and fails to consider the practical effects on the computer
industry. The Ninth Circuit instead should have followed a two-step
1. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
2. RAM is the portion of the computer that temporarily holds the computer program while it is
being processed. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
3. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (West 1977 & Supp. 1993). The Copyright Act of 1976 revised the
original Copyright Act of 1909. In 1980, Congress made amendments in the area of computer
programs to the 1976 Act.
4. MAI Systems, 991 F.2d at 518 n.5. Section 117 permits owners of computer programs to make
copies without obtaining permission from the program's copyright owner. 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West
Supp. 1993); see also infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
5. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (,Vest Supp. 1993).
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analysis focusing on how a copy of computer software is actually
acquired and used.
This Note begins with an examination of the Copyright Act, its
purposes and its limitations. Part II summarizes the issues and holding in
MAI Systems. Part III criticizes the MA! Systems decision on four
separate grounds. Finally, part IV proposes an approach for evaluating
copyright infringement cases involving software licensing agreements
and third-party users.
I.

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE

The United States Constitution lays the foundation for modem
copyright law by permitting Congress to create incentives that promote
progress in science.6 Based on this premise, Congress enacted the
Copyright Act to grant authors certain exclusive rights over their works
for a limited time. In providing these protections, Congress recognized
the need to balance the copyright owner's entitlement to a limited
monopoly with the public's interest in using the copyrighted work. In
1980, Congress explicitly extended this statutory scheme of exclusive
rights and limitations to computer software.
A.

The Integration of ComputerSoftware and Hardware

To understand the application of copyright principles to computer
programs, it is necessary to examine the technical aspects of computers.
Computer systems generally consist of two principal components:
hardware and software. Hardware is the physical machinery of the
computer system and usually consists of four functional components:
input,7 the central processing unit (CPU),8 memory,9 and output."0 These

6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.8. "The Congress shall have Power... to Promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries... " Id.
7. Keith London, Introduction to Computers 45-48, 106-08 (1986). Input devices permit
communication between the user and the computer. Examples include typewriter-like keyboards,
document readers, or other character recognition devices.
8. The CPU consists of control and logic functions that manipulate data by using available
memory devices. Id. at 45-48. CPUs perform arithmetic computations, logical operations, and
movement of data to appropriate locations in order to convert raw data tnto meaningful information.
Id.
9. Computer memories are data storage devices and exist in severml forms. RAM temporarily
stores only data and programs currently being processed by the computer. Id. at 46-47, 106-07.
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components interact within the hardware framework to perform
numerous functions." Central to the coordination of this interaction is
the microprocessor, a semiconductor chip that manipulates all of the data
To function, however, the microprocessor
within the computer."
requires instructions in the form of a computer program 3 that dictates all
of the computer's mechanical and electrical operations. t4
The operating system is the crucial computer program for controlling
the microprocessor's function. As a general rule, computers cannot
function unless the operating system is loaded into the computer's RAM
because the operating system manages the computer's physical resources
and orchestrates the execution of all programs. t5 Each time the user turns
on the computer, the computer automatically loads the operating system
from the program's storage device into the computer's RAM. This
unique feature of the operating system renders it susceptible to copyright
infringement claims under current copyright law.
B.

CopyrightProtectionfor Computer Software

Federal copyright law espouses both social and economic goals. The
limited monopoly granted by the Copyright Act seeks to promote the
public interest by facilitating public access to the created product 6 and
by advancing progress in science and art.'7 This promotion of progress is
achieved by granting financial incentives to individuals who produce
These incentives allow authors to restrict
intellectual works.'"
dissemination and reap economic benefits from the commercial
exploitation of their works. 9 This monopoly grant is, however, limited

10. Output devices are often integrated with input devices. The product of the CPU may be stored
on disk and simultaneously routed to a printed (hard copy) or a video display terminal (soft copy) for
review by the computer user. See id. at 45-48, 127-138.
11. John T. Soma, Computer Technology and the Law 22 (1983).
12. See London, supra note 7, at 45-48.
13. The terms "computer programs" and "computer software" are used interchangeably.
14. See London, supranote 7, at 45-48.
15. Stephen A. Ward & Robert H. Halstead, Jr., Computation Structures349 (1990).
16. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984).
8.
17. U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl.
18. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (citing
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
19. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429, 431-32.
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by the Constitution.20 Furthermore, traditional copyright policy favors
the public interest over the property rights of the author.2
Section 106 of the Copyright Act? confers a number of exclusive
rights on copyright owners." These include the exclusive rights to
reproduce the work in copies, to prepare derivative works based on the
copyrighted work, to distribute copies of the work to the public, and to
perform and display the work publicly.24 The copyright owner has the
sole right to exercise these rights and to exclude others from exercising
such rights. Furthermore, under current law, each right is separate and
assignable, and an owner may divide and grant the rights to a given work
in a piecemeal fashion.'
Prior to the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act, Congress struggled to
determine the scope of protection that should be given to computer
programs.6 In recognition of the complex issues involving computer
software, Congress created the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to research, study,
and recommend legislative changes related to computer programs.2 7 In
1978, CONTU issued its final report in which it recognized that
copyright protection should extend to computer programs in order to
encourage their creation and broad distribution in a competitive market.2"
CONTU acknowledged the importance of balancing the interest of
proprietors in obtaining reasonable protection against the risks of unduly
20. Id.; see also Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 912 (1980) (citing Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 378 F. Supp. 485, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), for the
proposition that the purpose of the Act is to protect an original design from copying and not to
convey to the proprietor any right to exclude others from the marketplace).
2 1. See Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Report of The Register of
Copyrights on the GeneralRevision of the US. Copyright Law 5 (Comm. Print 1961) ("As reflected
in the Constitution, the ultimate purpose of copyright legislation is to foster the growth of learning
and culture for the public welfare, and the grant of exclusive rights to authors for a limited time is
means to that end." ).
22. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West Supp. 1993).
23. Id. In 1990, the Visual Artists Rights Act added "moral rights" to a copyright owner's
exclusive rights which gives creators of qualifying "works of visual arts" rights of attribution and
integrity. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (West Supp. 1993).
24. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106.
25. Donald S. Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual Property Law 4-117
(1992).
26. Richard H. Stem, Section 117 of the CopyrightAct: Charterof the Software Users' Rights or
an Illusory Promise?, 7 W. New. Eng. L. Rev. 459 (1985).
27. Pub. L. No. 93-573, Act of Dec. 31, 1974, §201 [CONTU].
28. FinalReport of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Worky,
10-13 (1979) [CONTUFinalReport].
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burdening computer program users and the general public.2 9 As a result,
the report recommended the enactment of a new section 117,30 which
would grant "rightful possessors" of copyrighted software a limited right
to make copies and adaptations of their programs. 3 CONTU advised
that this section should be flexible enough to be able to adapt to future
advances in computer technology.3 2
In 1980, Congress enacted the Computer Software Copyright Act,
which incorporated CONTU's recommendations by adding both section
1173" and section 101's definition of a computer program34 to the
Copyright Act. Although the 1980 Act's legislative history consisted of
only a short paragraph in a congressional committee report,35 the
committee acknowledged that the Act embodied the recommendations of
CONTU.3 6 The absence of an extensive legislative history and the fact
that Congress enacted the proposed section 117 with only one change
have prompted courts to rely on the CONTU report as an expression of
legislative intent.37

29. Id. at 12.
30. Congress originally enacted section 117 to maintain the status quo concerning protection for
computer software while CONTU researched the feasibility of protecting computer programs.
31. CONTUFinaIReport, supranote 28 at 12-13.
32. Id. at 12.
33. 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West Supp. 1993). The section provides in part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy
of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that
computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the
computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only ....
Id.
34. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1993). The section provides the following definition: "A
'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result." Id.
35. H.R. Rep. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1, 23-24 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6482-83.
36. Id.
37. See Micro-Spare, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D. Mass. 1984); Atari, Inc. v. JS
& A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 9 (N.D. IlI. 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741,
750 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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Section 501(a) of the Copyright Act provides that any act inconsistent
with a copyright holder's exclusive rights constitute:s infringement. 8 To
prove an infringement claim, a plaintiff must establ:sh a valid copyright
and the "copying" of protectable expression. In MAI Systems, Peak's
copying involved the reproduction of MAI's copyrighted software in
"copies" in violation of MAI's section 106(1) rights. The Copyright Act
defines "copies" as material objects in which a work is fixed and from
which the work can be perceived or reproduced, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device." According to section 101 of the Act, a
work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when the copy is
sufficiently stable to be perceived or reproduced for a notable period of
time.4"
In the context of software licensing agreements, a licensee infringes an
owner's copyright if the licensee's use of the work exceeds the scope of
its license.4 These licenses, however, must be construed according to
the purposes underlying the governing federd copyright law.42
Therefore, license agreement provisions that contravene the Copyright
Act are preempted and unenforceable.43
Although the Copyright Act provides a statutory framework in which
courts can analyze copyright infringement claims, the Act does not cover
every conceivable situation.' In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
the United States Supreme Court indicated that the correct approach to
interpreting and applying copyright law to new technologies is to resolve
the competing interests of the copyright holder and the public in favor of
the public.45 Moreover, courts must evaluate an alleged infringing use
38. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(a) (West Supp. 1993).
39. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1993).
40. Id.
41. S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989 1(finding that exceeding the
scope of a license when the licensee copied and prepared a modified version of softvare programs
without the licensor's permission constitutes copyright infringement).
42. Id. at 1088.
43. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. '988).
44. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,431-32 (1984).
45. Id. at 422. The limited scope of the copyright holder's statut;ory monopoly balances the
holder's rights with the public interest. The purpose of conferring the copyright monopoly is to
provide benefits to the public from the labors of authors. When technological changes render its
literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose. Id.
(citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
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against the backdrop of legislative intent and case history, with an eye
toward future applications of the Act.46
D.

Defenses to CopyrightInfringement

Although the Copyright Act grants a number of exclusive rights to the
copyright holder, these rights are not absolute. The Act limits a
copyright owner's exclusive rights by exempting some otherwise
infringing uses from copyright liability.47 Two of these exemptions are
pertinent to an analysis of the MA1 Systems decision. First, section 117
permits owners of a computer program to make copies without obtaining
permission from the program's copyright owner.48 Second, section 107
codifies the fair use doctrine49 and excuses an otherwise infringing use if
the purpose of the use is fair." Antitrust principles and the judicially
created copyright misuse doctrine create additional defenses to claims of
infringement and are relevant to the MA! Systems decision.
Section 117 Authorizes Owner Copies of Computer Software

1.

Section 117 was intended to provide "legitimate possessors" of
computer programs permission to copy the programs in order to use them
in a computer.5 ' The members of CONTU noted that computer programs
on diskettes could not be used without first being loaded into a
computer's memory device. This act of loading a program from a
storage medium into memory automatically creates a copy of the
program. CONTU's Final Report recommended the adoption of section
117 so that one who "rightfully possessed" a computer program would
have a legal right to use it without fear of exposure to copyright
liability. 2 Thus, Congress adopted section 117 to protect the legitimate
interests of software purchasers and to facilitate the use of computer
programs.
When Congress enacted the Computer Software Copyright Act,
however, it made one change in CONTU's recommendations. The final

46. Id.
47. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 107-120 (West 1977 & Supp. 1993).
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West Supp. 1993).
See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
17U.S.C.A. § 107.
CONTUFinalReport, supranote 28, at 13.
Id.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 69:405, 1994

version granted "owners," as opposed to "rightful possessors," the
limited right to copy and adapt their software. Congress's failure to
explain this textual substitution has generated significant confusion over
the meaning of "owner" in relation to section 117's applicability. 3
Faced with a lack of specific guidance, courts have looked to legislative
history to determine the purpose and scope of section 117.54
In copyright infringement cases involving software licensing
agreements, however, courts have not followed a consistent approach in
defining "owner."
In Vault v. Quaid, the Fifth Circuit analyzed
copyright infringement claims under section 117 even though the
defendant was a licensee of the software program. 5 The court did not
specifically address the definition of owner, but its framework of
analysis implied that the term included those who acquired a program by
license. 6 In clear contrast to Vault, the district court in CMAX v.
Cleveland5 7 rejected the licensees' section 117 defense. The court
reasoned that the defendants never "owned" a copy of the leased
program and
that mere possession did not render them software
"owners." 8 The courts, therefore, have issued conflicting rulings on the
scope of "ownership" in licensing agreement cases, despite the clear
language in CONTU's Final Report.
2.

Section 107 Permits CopyingforFairUses

One of the most important and well established limitations on the
exclusive rights of copyright owners is the doctrine of fair use. 9 Fair use
is the privilege to use copyrighted material in a reasonable manner

53. Stephen Kyle Tapp & Daniel E. Wanat, Computer Software Copyright Issues: Section 117
andFair Use, 22 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 197,215 (1992).
54. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
55. Vault, 847 F.2d at 257,259.
56. Id. at 257.
57. 804 F. Supp. 337 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
58. Id. at 356. Several commentators criticize the Vault decision as being a "rogue elephant"
among those cases construing section 117 and support the contention that "owner' does not include
"licensee."
See, e.g., Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Propery Protection and Reverse
Engineeringof Computer Programs in the United States and the European Community, 8 High
Tech. L.J. 25, 83 (1993) (citing John M. Conley & Vance T. Brown, Revisiting § 117 of the
CopyrightAct: An EconomicApproach, Computer Law., Nov. 1990, at 1, 9).
59. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 65 (1976), rep,-inted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659,5678.
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without the copyright owner's consent.60 This doctrine balances the
rights of copyright holders with the public's interest in broad
dissemination of copyrighted work.6"
Section 107 enumerates four factors for determining whether the use
of a copyrighted work without permission is fair.62 These factors are 1)
the purpose and character of the use of the copyrighted material, 2) the
nature of the copyrighted work, 3) the amount and substantiality of the
work used, and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the
copyrighted material.63 Consideration of all four factors is mandatory in
all circumstances and may not be limited to the uses referred to in the
preamble of section 107,' which merely illustrate the types of uses likely
to qualify as fair uses.65
When Congress incorporated the fair use doctrine into the 1976 Act, it
acknowledged that the defense was an "equitable rule of reason."66
Section 107 grants courts discretion to adapt the privilege to particular
situations, especially during a period of rapid technological change.67
Thus, when strict enforcement of the rights of a copyright holder under
section 106 conflicts with the purposes of copyright law or with some
other important societal value, courts are free to fashion an appropriate
fair use exemption.6"
Prior to 1984, the lower federal courts had shaped the fair use doctrine
without meaningful guidance from the Supreme Court.6 9 In that year,
however, the Supreme Court reexamined the purposes underlying the fair
use exception in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios.70 The plaintiffs in
the case, Universal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions, 71 alleged
60. Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 1981).
61. Wainwright See., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied,434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
62. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West Supp. 1993).
63. Id.
64. Section 107 specifically mentions criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship,
and research as examples of fair uses. Id.
65. Pacific & Southern Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1004 (1985).
66. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supranote 59, at 65, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5679.
67. Id.
68. Pacific & Southern, 744 F.2d at 1495.
69. William NV.Fisher III, Reconstructingthe FairUse Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1659, 1663
(1988).
70. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
71. Universal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions are owners of copyrights on television
programs that are broadcast over public airwaves. Id. at 419-20.
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that consumers' use of Sony Betamax recorders to tape copyrighted
programs and watch them later, a practice known as "time-shifting," was
a copyright infringement. The Court considered the fair use defense and
held that home time-shifting was a fair use.
The Court noted that the definition of exclusive rights in section 106
was prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107 Ihrough 118." 2 The
Court explained that those sections enumerated various uses of
copyrighted materials that were not infringements.73 It proceeded to
analyze the practice of time-shifting under the four fair use factors of
section 107. First, the Court concluded that time-shifting for private
home use was a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.7' Second, the Court
determined that the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual work
and the fact that time-shifting merely enables viewers to view at a later
time works that they had previously been invited to watch rebutted the
presumption that reproducing a copyrighted work in its entirety was
unfair.75 Third, the Court held that a use that has no demonstrable effect
upon the potential market for, or the value of, a copyrighted work need
not be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to create.76
The Court explained that the prohibition of such uses would inhibit
access to ideas without providing any countervailing benefit.77 Finally,
the Court focused on the fact that time-shifting yields societal benefits by
expanding public access to broadcast television programs. 78 The Sony
decision upheld the requirement of evaluating all four statutory factors
and emphasized that no single factor is determinative.
3.

CopyrightMisuse Bars Infringement Claims

The doctrine of copyright misuse, in combination with antitrust
principles, provides an additional defense to copyright infringement.
Copyright misuse is an attempt by a copyright holder to use rights
protected by a copyright in a manner adverse to the underlying legal
principles of copyright law.79 The rationale for allowing a copyright

72. Id. at 447.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 449.
75. Id. at 449-50.
76. Id. at 450.
77. Id. at450-51.
78. Id. at 454.
79. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970,976 (4th Cir. 1990).
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misuse defense is to prohibit the use of a copyright to expand the limited
monopoly grant."0 One example of misuse is employing a copyright to
create tying arrangements in violation of antitrust laws. Such copyright
misuse contravenes the public policy goals of the Constitution and laws
of the United States.8
The copyright misuse defense evolved from the specialized doctrine
of patent misuse82 created by the courts to restrain anti-competitive
abuses of the patent monopoly.83 Copyright law and patent law serve
similar public interests. Both seek to encourage the introduction of new
ideas and knowledge into society by rewarding authors and inventors
with exclusive rights to their works for a limited time.84 This monopoly,
however, does not extend to property not subject to the copyright or
patent."
An attempt to use a copyright to violate antitrust laws establishes a
copyright misuse defense.8 6 Antitrust doctrines are based upon the
notion that competition produces better products at better prices and
improves the overall efficiency of the market. Antitrust laws seek to
eliminate anticompetitive behavior. An example of such behavior
involving copyrighted material in the computer industry would be an
arrangement that conditions the sale of one product upon the purchase of
another product. This practice, called "tying," harms competition by
foreclosing the tied market to competitors. Tying arrangements are
typically employed when sellers of one product cannot compete in the
market for a second product by offering lower prices, and instead attempt
to monopolize the second market by eliminating competition in that
market.

80. Copyright law promotes progress in science and useful arts by granting a limited monopoly.
The public policy behind this limited monopoly forbids the extension of the copyright to secure an
exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the U.S. Copyright Office and which is contrary
to public policy. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
81. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973.
82. The doctrine of patent misuse is well established. Id. at 973. The leading case establishing
the defense is Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). In Morton Salt, the
Supreme Court refused to enforce a patent because Morton Salt extended the exclusionary power
granted by its patent beyond the protected product by tying the sale of an unpatented product to the
sale of a patented product. Id. at 492.
83. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975-76. Tie-ins are prohibited under section 3 of the Clayton Act.
15 U.S.C.A. § 14 (West 1973).
84. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976.
85. Id.
86. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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A tying arrangement violates section 1 of the Sherman Act87 if the
seller has "sufficient economic power"8 in the market for the tying
product.8 9 The existence of such economic power is usually inferred
from a seller's share of the market.9 In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc.,91 the most recent Supreme Court decision
regarding tying, the court held that the determination of the existence of
market power depends on the economic reality of the market at issue.92
Although the attempted use of a copyright to violate antitrust law
constitutes copyright misuse, the use does not need to actually violate the
antitrust laws in order to establish a copyright misuse defense. 93 The
defense is an equitable doctrine that applies when use of the copyright
violates any public policy.94 Thus, courts have s-astained the defense
when the use violates the copyright laws or the judicial process. 95
II.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND HOLDINGS I1NMAI SYSTEMS

MAI Systems Corporation (MAI) sued Peak Computer, Inc. (Peak) for
copyright infringement based on Peak's use of MA.I's operating system
when Peak repaired MAI computer systems. 96 MA I is a multi-national
corporation that, until recently, manufactured and sold computer
systems.97 Additionally, MAI developed the operating system designed

87. 15 U.S.C.A. § I (West Supp. 1993).
88. Market power is the ability to control a purchaser's actions due to control over a tying product
that a seller would not otherwise have in a competitive market. Such power restrains competition on
the merits in the market for the tied item and hence, violates the Sherman Act. Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
89. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
90. Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 17.
91. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
92. Id. at 2082.
93. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970,978 (4th Cir. 1990).
94. Id.
95. Qad, Inc. v. ALN Assocs. Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261, 1267 (N.D. Il1. 1991). In Qad, the plaintiff
pursued an infringement suit against the defendant by falsely asserting that its product was a
completely original work. Id. at 1266. The plaintiff sought and received an injunction against the
defendant. Id. at 1267. The court concluded that the plaintiff abused the judicial process by using
its copyright to sue the defendant and restrain it from using material over which the plaintiff itself
had no right Id.
96. MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,513 (9th Cir. 1993).
97. Appellants' Opening Brief at 3, MAI Systems (No. 92-55363). MAI manufactured and sold a
line of minicomputers under the model nos. MPx, Spx, GPx4O, and GPx7O. Id. at 3. MAI computers
consist of a terminal, printer, and "system" (that is, software). Id. at 6.
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to operate each of its computer systems.98 Although MAI discontinued
its hardware sales business,99 it continued to service and repair the
computers it had sold.'00
The software packages for the MAI computer systems are copyrighted
works.' These computer programs are licensed to MAI customers when
they purchase MAI computer systems."0 2 MAI's license agreement for
its operating system restricts the use of that software.0 3
Peak, on the other hand, is a small, independent computer service and
maintenance organization.'O° Peak performs two basic services: routine
maintenance and immediate repair services in response to emergencies
created by system faults. 05 When the alleged infringement occurred,
approximately 50 to 70 percent of Peak's customers owned MAI
computer systems.10 6 Pursuant to a written contract between Peak and
each of its customers, Peak serviced and repaired computer equipment

98. Appellee's Brief at 4, MA! Systems (No. 76-1917). MAI spent in excess of $10 million in
employment and capital equipment costs to develop this software. Id.
99. Appellants' Opening Brief at 4, MAI Systems (No. 92-55363).
100. Appellee's Brief at 4, MAI Systems (No. 92-55363). MAI sold thousands of these computers,
many of which remain in active use. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. A representative MAI software license provides in part:
4. Software License.
(a) License ....
Customer may use the Software (one version with maximum of two copies
permitted-a working and a backup copy) . . . solely to fulfill Customer's own internal
information processing needs on the particular items of Equipment ....
The term "Software"
includes; without limitation, all basic operating system software ....
(b) Customer Prohibited Acts.... Any possession or use of the Software ... not expressly
authorized under this License or any act which might jeopardize [MAI's] rights or interest in the
Software . . . is prohibited, including without limitation, examination, disclosure, copying,
modification, reconfiguration, augmentation, adaptation, emulation, visual display or reduction
to visually perceptible form or tampering ....
MASystems, 991 F.2d at 517 n. 3.
104. Appellants' Opening Brief at 4, MAI Systems (No. 92-55363).
105. Routine maintenance consists of generalized cleaning to ensure the computer operates
smoothly. Appellants' Opening Brief at 6, MAI Systems (No. 92-55363). Emergency repairs consist
of identifying the functional problem and supplying the necessary replacement parts. Id. at 7. In
repairing the computer, the service technician will operate the system by running the software
contained in the computer. Id.
106. Appellee's Brief at 9, MA!Systems (No. 92-55363).
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for a fixed fee.1" 7 In this respect, Peak competed directly with MAI for
service and maintenance contracts for MAI computers'0 8
MAI's operating system is essential to repairing or maintaining MAI
computers. 0 9 In a typical service call on an MAI computer system, the
service technician uses the MAI operating system software to view the
"error log," which provides an initial indication of the computer
problem."0 Once the problem is identified, the technician simply
replaces each printed circuit board until the system fault clears."'
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that Peak
infringed MAI's software copyrights by running MAI's operating system
when servicing MAI computers." 2 In reaching this conclusion, the court
focused exclusively on whether or not loading software into RAM
13
created a "copy" of that software in violation of the Copyright Act.
Although the court acknowledged the lack of authority on point,"14 it
interpreted section 101 of the Copyright Act and relied on Apple
Computerv. Formula International"' and Vault Corp. v. Quaid Softvare
Ltd."6 to support its contention that a program in RAM was "fixed,"'"'
and thus qualified as a copy under the Copyright Act." 8
The court, in a brief footnote without analysis, rejected the application
of section 117 on the ground that MAI computer purchasers did not
qualify as "owners" under the Copyright Act." 9 As mere licensees,
Peak's customers were not eligible for protection under section 117.20 If
107. Appellants' Opening Brief at 5, MAI Systems (No. 92-55363).
108. Appellee's Brief at 7, MAISystems (No. 92-55363).
109. Id.
110. Appellee's Brief at 11, MAISystems (No. 92-55363).
111. Appellants' Opening Brief at 7, AL41 Systems (No. 92-55363).
112. MAI Systems, 991 F.2dat 518.
113. Id. at 518-19.
114. The court acknowledged that authorities, such as case law and treatises, on the loading of
software into computers were troubling because they did not distinguish among various forms of
computer memories such as the RAM, the hard disk, or the read only memory (ROM) into which
software can be loaded. Id. at 519.
115. 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
116. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
117. The court reasoned that Peak's ability to view the system error log while the software was
loaded in RAM adequately demonstrated that the representation in RAM was "sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period
of more than transitory duration." MAI Systems, 991 F.2d at 518.
118. Id. at 519.
119. Id. at 518 n.5.
120. Id.
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the customers had protection under section 117, they could have
extended that protection to Peak's repair people."' Furthermore, the
court found that MAI licensed its computer software only to the
purchasers of MAI computer systems." Since the license prohibited the
licensees from authorizing others to use or copy the software, the court
concluded that Peak's use was unauthorized and hence an
infringement." 3
El.

ANALYSIS OF THE MAI SYSTEMS DECISION

The MAI Systems decision conflicts with federal copyright law and its
underlying principles in four respects. First, the court disregarded the
applicability of section 117. Second, the use of MAI's computer
software in performing computer repairs falls within the fair use
exemption of the Copyright Act. Third, the decision fails to construe the
Copyright Act as a whole. Finally, the decision improperly extends the
limited monopoly granted to copyright holders, thus constituting
copyright misuse.
The CourtDisregardedSection 117

A.

The MAI Systems court failed to evaluate the applicability of section
117. In determining whether or not software loaded into RAM
constituted a copy under the Copyright Act, the court evaluated two
cases: Apple Computer v. Formula International24 and Vault Corp. v.
2 Although the court relied on these cases to apply
QuaidSoftware, Ltd."
the statutory provisions of section 101 to software loaded into RAM, the
court disregarded the approach adopted in these cases to determine the
applicability of section 117 to the copy of software.
Both the MAI Systems and the Apple Computer decisions involved
copyright infringement claims for copyrighted software in a computer
memory device. In Apple Computer, the court evaluated the legislative
history of section 117, and concluded that section 117 only applied to an
"owner-user" of a computer who "rightfully" owned a copy of a

121.
122.
123.
124.

17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West Supp. 1993).
Id. at519.
Id.
594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984).

125. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
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copyrighted program. 2 6 The court determined that defendant Formula
International, a computer kit manufacturer, was clearly not an owner or a
user of a computer.
In contrast to Formula International, Peak's customers were owners
and users of MAI computers. In light of the Appie Computer court's
extensive evaluation of section 117's intent and purpose, the Apple
Computer court's use of the term "rightfully" to describe "own" suggests
an intent to include legitimate holders and rightful possessors of
computer software under section 117. Peak customers were legitimate
possessors of MAI operating systems under their software licensing
agreements. Thus, section 117 should grant them the right to authorize
Peak to use those programs to maintain MAI computer systems.
The MA4 Systems court relied on the Vault decision to determine
whether Peak's actions created a copy. The court, however, ignored
Vault's analysis of section 117. In Vault, the plaintiff licensed its
copyrighted programs to the defendant.'2 The plaintiff accused the
defendant of copyright infringement for directly loading the copyrighted
program into the memory of the defendant's computer for the purpose of
developing a new program. 2 The court held that the defendant's actions
clearly fell within the section 117 exemption since the loading of the
plaintiff's program into the memory of a computer was an essential step
in the utilization of the program.'2 9 The Vault court's thorough section
117 analysis implied that owners of a copy include those who acquired it
by license. 30 MAI Systems, however, ignored this implication of the
Vault decision and held that a licensee was not an owner under section
117.
Fundamental to both the Apple Computer and Vault decisions was an
evaluation of the origins of section 117 in order to determine its
applicability to new technology. Although MAI Systerms presented a case
of first impression, the court failed to evaluate either the purpose or
history of section 117 to determine its scope.

126. 594 F. Supp. at 621-22.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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847 F.2d at 257.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 261.
See supranote 55-56 and accompanying text.
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B.

Peak's Use ofMAI's Software Was a FairUse Under Section 107

Loading computer software into RAM for the sole purpose of
repairing or maintaining a computer system constitutes a fair use. In
light of the Sony decision, the reproduction of an entire copyrighted
program in RAM does not necessarily constitute copyright infiingement.
Rather, evaluation of the purpose and necessity for making such a copy,
the benefits conferred to computer owners, and the effect on the value of
the copyrighted work tip the balance in favor of a fair use exemption.
The first factor of section 107 requires evaluation of the purpose of the
use, including whether the use is for a commercial or nonprofit
educational purpose. Loading the operating system software in RAM for
computer repair is a noncommercial use. Arguably, such loading by
Peak is a commercial use since Peak is in the business of repairing
computers for profit. However, the average computer owner cannot
exercise the right to use the computer system or the software without the
assistance of third parties.
Computer owners typically employ
Independent Service Organizations (ISOs) to repair their computer
systems. Implicit in this arrangement is the assumption that such
computer owners are authorizing these third parties to take every step
necessary to repair the computer. Because loading the operating system
into RAM is necessary to use the computer, such use, whether by the
software owner or the authorized third party, is for a noncommercial
purpose. By loading the sofhvare into RAM, the computer owner is
merely exercising the right to use the software in conjunction with his or
her computer.
Moreover, the nature of operating systems requires that the entire
program be reproduced in RAM when the system is turned on.' This
fact does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of
fair use.'
Loading software into RAM merely enables a computer
owner to obtain information regarding the underlying hardware. Peak
uses this copy to understand and repair the operating failures of the
computer system.
Section 107 also requires courts to consider the effect of the use upon
the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work.'
The
Supreme Court asserted in Sony that copyright owners must demonstrate
the likelihood of harm to the copyright holder's ability to obtain rewards
131. See suprapart I.A.
132. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 433.
133. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4) (West Supp. 1993).
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granted by the copyright.'34 The copying of software into RAM for the
purpose of repairing computer systems does not adversely affect the
market for the copyrighted software.
Moreover, Peak's use caused no actual harm to MAI's copyrights.
MAI did not report any decrease in sales of its software as a result. The
only conceivable harm to MAI would be a decrease in its computer
service business. MAI's software copyright did not grant it the exclusive
right to repair its hardware systems.
Peak's reproduction of MAI's software did not overstep the bounds of
necessity. Fair use reproductions of a computer program must not
exceed what is necessary to understand the unprotected elements of the
work. In MA Systems, computer system errors were not protected under
MAI's software copyright. Loading software into PAM is the only way
to discover these errors. Thus, in light of section 'L07 's factors, Peak's
software use falls squarely within the purview of the fair use defense.'35
C.

MAI Systems Violated the Principlesand Purposesof the
CopyrightAct

The MA! Systems decision unreasonably favored copyright holders'
rights to the detriment of the general public. By denying section 117
protection to licensees, the court granted copyright holders the
unwarranted power to curtail software users' statutory rights. Similarly,
the court's failure to evaluate fair use curtails computer owners' ability
to hire third parties to repair their computers. As a result, the court's
decision inhibits the development of copyright law with respect to
advances in the computer industry.
1.

MAI Systems Contravenes the Purpose of Section 117

The MAI Systems decision contravenes Congress's intent to safeguard
computer users' rights. MAI Systems denies section 117 protection to a
significant portion of software purchasers based on a differentiation
between licensees and owners. This distinction creates a superficial and
unrealistic dichotomy. As such, this decision violates section 117's

134. 464 U.S. at483.
135. Despite this fair use analysis, the evaluation of section 107 alone in software infringement
cases is not adequate because section 107 focuses exclusively on use and not on the individual's
method of acquiring the software. Hence, an unlawful possessor of software could be exempt from
liability regardless of the fact that he pirated the software.
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purpose of allowing all computer users the right to reasonably use their
software.
Without analysis or case support, the MAI Systems court ruled that
Peak's customers, as licensees of MAI's software, had no right to permit
Peak to access or copy the software into a computer's RAM for the
purpose of maintaining and servicing the computer system. The court
reasoned that MAI's software licensees do not "own" the copy of the
software licensed to them. Implicit in this conclusion is the contention
that a software licensing agreement is not a sale of a computer program
for purposes of section 117. Thus, the customer in a licensing
arrangement becomes something less than an owner.'3 6 Because
licensing agreements are now the prevailing method for transferring
software to purchasers, 37 the owner-licensee distinction creates a
superficial dichotomy. By allowing software manufacturers to withdraw
the benefits of section 117 from their customers by labeling the software
transaction something other than a sale,1 31 the MAI Systems decision
subverts software
users' rights and renders section 117 an "illusory
39
promise."'
2.

FailureTo Evaluate FairUse Underminesthe CopyrightAct

The Ninth Circuit's failure to consider the fair use exemption
undermines the purpose of the Copyright Act. The Act's statutory
framework manifests Congress's intent to balance the rights of copyright
holders with those of the public. Although loading software into RAM
conflicts with the exclusive reproduction right conferred by section 106,
section 107 provides a limited exemption for repair purposes. The Ninth
Circuit ignored fair use considerations, upsetting the statute's balance in
favor of copyright holders.
Consequently, the court's approach
undermines the purpose of copyright law.
Congress intended that courts recognize the fair use defense in select
cases, in order to uphold the Act's underlying principles.Y° In MAI
Systems, the Ninth Circuit examined the technology of loading software
into computer memory in a novel context-third party computer repair.
136. See Stem, supranote 26, at 467.
137. Committee Report: Division Ill-Copyrights, 1987 ABA See. Patent, Trademark &
Copyright Law Rep. 181, Aug. 6, 1987.
138. Examples of putatively non-sale transactions include bailments, leases, and licenses. See
Stem, supranote 26, at 467 n.47.
139. See Stem, supra note 26.
140. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supranote 59, at 66, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5679.
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Computer programs cannot be used unless the lardware system is
functioning properly. The overwhelming majority of computer software
owners, however, lack the skills and equipment necessary to repair their
own computers.141 The average consumer can repair the computer only
by authorizing third parties, such as ISOs, to make the copies that are
necessary to fix the system. 42 The MAT Systems decision prevents
software users from exercising this prerequisite to computer usage by
prohibiting them from authorizing third parties to load the software into
the computer's RAM for the purpose of repairs. The court's failure to
employ the fair use defense to protect the practical necessities of
computer usage unreasonably favors copyright holders over43the general
public in direct contravention to traditional copyright policy.
3.

The MAI Systems Decision Creates an Inflexible Standardfor
EvaluatingNew Technologies

The Ninth Circuit's approach to evaluating copyright infringement
creates an unworkable, inflexible, and unrealistic framework for
evaluating claims involving new technologies. Although the Copyright
Act provides a statutory framework, the Act does not encompass every
conceivable situation or invention.'" Hence, courts must evaluate an
alleged infiinging use with an eye toward future applications. Because
the MAI Systems court failed to make this evaluation, its decision will
inhibit the development of copyright law with respect to advances in
computer technology.
With the increasing use of licensing agreements in software
transactions,' 45 literal interpretation of the owner requirement of section
117 is neither practical nor desirable. Software raanufacturers massmarket computer software under shrink wrap licenses, 46 thus rendering
the average consumer and computer user a licensee. The MAI Systems
determination that a licensee is not an "owner" fails to accommodate this
widespread practice and denies section 117 benefits to the average
consumer.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See Stem, supranote 26, at 479-40.
Id. at479.
See supranotes 16-17 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 44-46 and accompanying text.

145. See supranote 137.
146. Licenses are incorporated under the software product's plastic wrapping. The license
typically indicates that by opening the plastic packaging, the consumer is agreeing to the terms of the
agreement.
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To promote technological innovations, the Copyright Act must be
adaptable to changing technologies. From its inception, copyright law
developed in response to significant changes in technology. 47 Federal
copyright law imposes a duty on courts to evaluate such changes in light
of the principles and purpose underlying the Copyright Act. 148 The Ninth
Circuit failed to evaluate industry practice in MAI's copyright
infringement claim. As a result, the court stifled the development of
copyright law to the public's detriment.
D. MAI's CopyrightExtension Constitutes CopyrightMisuse
MAI's attempt to control the maintenance of its computer systems
through its copyright is a clear example of copyright misuse. When the
MAI Systems court held that software purchasers were not allowed to
authorize Peak to run the software in RAM to repair computer systems, it
essentially granted MAI an exclusive right to maintain and service its
own computers. This decision is an unwarranted extension of the limited
monopoly granted under the Copyright Act. It also violates antitrust
principles and contravenes public policy by allowing MAI to tie
computer maintenance to purchase of its software.
Tying arrangements are illegal under antitrust law because they are
undesirable and unnecessary restraints of trade. 49 In EastmanKodak Co.
v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,"'0 Kodak, a manufacturer of
photocopiers and micrographic equipment, provided both services and
parts to its customers.' Although Kodak provided 80 to 95 percent of
the service for its machines, ISOs began competing with Kodak in the
service and repair business.'52 In response, Kodak implemented a policy
of selling replacement parts for its machines only to those who either
used Kodak service or repaired their own machines. 53 Kodak also
limited the ISOs' access to Kodak parts available from other sources.'5 4
As a result, many ISOs were either forced out of business or lost
substantial revenue, and customers were forced to switch to Kodak

147.
148.
149.
150.

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,430 (1984).
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).

151. Id. at 2077.
152. ISOs provided this service at a price substantially lower than Kodak's. Id. at 2077.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2078.
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service even though they preferred ISO service. ' s Eighteen ISOs
subsequently sued Kodak for unlawfully
tying the sale of service for
15 6
parts.
of
sale
the
to
machines
Kodak
The Supreme Court held that sufficient evidence of a tying
arrangement existed to preclude summary judgment for Kodak." 7 The
Court found that distinct markets existed for the two products because
services and parts are sold separately. Furthermore,, the development of
the copier service industry demonstrated the efficiency of a separate
market for service."18 The court found that Kodak's refusal to sell parts
to third parties unless they agreed
not to buy service from ISOs provided
59
sufficient evidence of a tie.1
In the present case, MAI used its copyright to create an illegal tying
arrangement between computer software sales and computer hardware
maintenance. Like Kodak, MIAI competes with IS(s for the service and
repair of its product. Just as Kodak used its control over parts to stifle
competition from ISOs, MAI used its control over computer software to
effectively restrain, if not eliminate, ISO competition in the hardware
maintenance market. Although MAI did not explicitly condition the sale
of its software upon purchase of MAI service, the efFect is the same. The
fact that MAI customers purchased their systems from MAI but entered
into service contracts with Peak easily demonstrates that distinct markets
exist for computer software and computer maintenance. Moreover,
Peak's substantial business underscores the efficiency of a separate
market for service. Thus, MAI's copyright claim essentially gave MAI
the power to prohibit ISOs from competing with MAI in the service
market.160
Additionally, MAI's copyright protection for i:ts operating system
software confers sufficient economic advantage to make such a tying
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2080.
158. Id.
159. Id. For a more detailed analysis, see Daniel E. Lazaroff, Reflections on Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Services, Inc.: Continued Confusion Regarding Tying Arrangements and
Antitrust Jurisprudence,69 Wash. L. Rev. 101 (1994).
160. In fact, seven independent service organizations that compete with MAI in the business of
maintaining MAI minicomputers sought a preliminary injunction agairst MAI two months after the
MAI Systems decision. MAI Systems Enjoined From Making False or Misleading Statements to
Customers of Competitors, PR Newswire, July 2, 1993, at 1. The ISOs alleged that MAI was telling
their customers that the Ninth Circuit decision prevented MAI's maintenance competitors from even
turning on an MAI computer to maintain it. Id. A federal district court in Virginia enjoined MAI
Systems from making false or misleading statements about its maintenance competitors. Id.
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arrangement effective. 6' In using this economic advantage to tie
software to computer service, MAI established an undesirable restraint of
trade. As a result, MAI's conduct violates the public policy embodied in
the Sherman Act, if not the letter of the law.
Even if Peak cannot successfully assert an antitrust claim, the fact that
MAI's conduct raises antitrust concerns defeats MAI's infringement
claim on the ground of copyright misuse. A copyright holder cannot use
a copyright to gain control of products over which it has no such right.'62
For example, it is well established in patent cases that a patentee cannot
extend its lawful monopoly to control another item that is not part of the
patent. 63 When a copyright holder attempts to use legal proceedings to
protect an improper extension of such copyright, courts should refuse to
enforce the copyright." 4 Concrete proof of antitrust violations is not
necessary to prevail on a claim of copyright misuse.'65
In Lasercomb v. Reynolds, the defendants claimed the plaintiff
Lasercomb, a software manufacturer, misused its software copyright by
including clauses in its standard licensing agreement that prevented the
licensee from participating in the creation of computer-assisted diemaking software.1 66 The court held that the anticompetitive language in
the licensing agreement constituted copyright misuse. 167 The court
reasoned that the misuse arose from the software manufacturer's attempt
to use its copyright to control competition in an area outside the
copyright's scope.' 68 The court found such use to69 be adverse to the
public policy embodied in the grant of the copyright.
Like Lasercomb's conduct, MAI's anticompetitive behavior is
evidence of copyright misuse. MAI used its copyright to eliminate
competition in the computer repair business so that it would reap greater
rewards than the copyrighted software produces. The extension of
MAI's limited monopoly in software to include computer maintenance
reduces creativity and competition in the market for computer

161. Daniel K. Dik, Copyrighted Software and Tying Arrangements: A Fresh Appreciationfor
Per Se Illegality, 10 Computer/L.. 413,418-19 (1990).
162. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
163. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Invest. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944) (patents).
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970,978 (4th Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id. at 972.
Id. at 978-79.
Id. at 979.
Id. at 978.
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maintenance. The decision also prohibits customers from purchasing
computer maintenance service from third parties, in violation of the
public policies embodied in both the Copyright Act and the Sherman
Act.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO MA! SYSTEMS
As an alternative to the MA Systems approach, courts should follow a
two-step analysis when evaluating such infringement claims. First,
courts should examine section 117's applicability by determining
whether the software user is a legitimate possessor of the copy of
software. Second, courts should evaluate the third party's use of the
copy in light of section 107 principles. By adopting this approach, courts
can balance the competing interests of software manufacturers and
computer users. This approach protects manufaclurers from software
piracy but allows legitimate software possessors to use their software
without fear of infringement.
A.

The Applicability of Section 117

Copyright infringement claims involving licensing agreements require
evaluation of section 117. In determining its applicability, courts should
focus on the method by which the software purchaser acquired the
computer program. Additionally, courts should examine the section's
legislative history, as well as industry practice, to resolve ambiguities in
the statute's application and to ensure compliance with copyright law
This approach protects software users' rights and adheres
principles.'
to the spirit and purpose of the Copyright Act.
Section 117 protection should not automatically exclude licensees
since they acquire possessory rights under the software agreement. In
S.O.S. v. Payday,'7' the Ninth Circuit held that software license
agreements must be construed in light of the principles underlying
federal copyright law. Although the court did not evaluate any section
117 issues, the court's analysis of the software agreement between the
parties is pertinent to the "owner" issue. The court held that under the

170. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text; see also Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988).
171. 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989).
172. Id. at 1088.
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license agreement, 73 S.O.S., the copyright holder, retained title to any
copy of the computer software, but Payday, the licensee, acquired the
"right to possess" a copy of the software.1 74 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
explicitly recognized that a licensee "rightfully possesses" a copy of the
computer software under a licensing agreement. MA! Systems, however,
failed to even consider the implications of the S.O.S. decision.
The S.O.S approach to evaluating software license agreements
represents a logical and policy-wise method of determining who is an
"owner" under section 117. The term "owner" must be construed to
encompass a "rightful possessor" in light of section 117's intent to
include all legitimate software users. 75 This interpretation adheres to the
spirit and purpose of the statutory exemption. In addition, it balances the
legitimate interests of copyright holders without hampering the rights of
software users, and curtails software piracy by requiring courts to
evaluate the legitimacy of possession.
Equating a "licensee of software" to an "owner of a copy of software,"
does not adversely affect the copyright owner's exclusive right to
reproduction under section 106.76 Congress enacted section 117 to
77
expressly limit the reproduction right for the benefit of computer users.1
Thus, a copyright holder still has the power to control the reproduction of
his or her work except in those situations explicitly outlined in section
117.
B.

Section 117 in Conjunction with Section 107

Once a court determines that an individual is a rightful possessor of
computer software, the court should then construe section 117 in light of
section 107's underlying principles. Loading software into a computer's
RAM by merely turning on the computer should not necessarily
constitute infringement. Rather, courts should look to whether the
purpose of the copying into RAM violates the principles underlying the
exclusive rights granted under section 106.

173. The relevant language of the license agreement stated that "S.O.S. retains all rights of
ownership." Id.
174. Id.
175. See supranotes 51-52 and accompanying text.
176. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (Vest 1977 & Supp. 1993).
177. Whether software manufacturers can contract around the section 117 limitation by denying
section 117 rights to licensees is beyond the scope of this paper. Such contracts may raise antitrust
and copyright misuse issues.
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Copyright infringement claims involving third parties necessitate
consideration of section 107. Situations commonly arise in which an
alleged infringer is not an owner under section 117 but was authorized,
either explicitly or implicitly, by the owner to copy the software. 78
Section 107 was intended to be a broad exception to copyright
infringement. Arguably, section 117 evolved from section 107 and was
enacted to ensure the application of fair use principles in specific
situations involving software. Thus, under certain circumstances, these
third parties should not be liable for infringement. 79
Copyright law must adapt to changing technologies and novel
applications. Section 117 and 107 protect the legitimate interests of
copyright holders while providing exemptions for he public's benefit.
Thus, courts should always examine third parties' reasons for copying
software to determine whether their use violates the principles
underlying the act. This approach complies with Congress's intent and
ensures the Copyright Act's adaptability to new technologies.
V.

CONCLUSION

In its desire to accurately apply the Copyright Act to computers, the
MA[ Systems court disregarded previous case law and industry standards.
By failing to apply section 117 or to evaluate section 107, the court
subverted software users' rights in direct contravention of federal
copyright principles. Moreover, the court's approach to evaluating
infringement claims resulted in an inflexible and unrealistic framework
for resolving cases involving new technologies. Finally, the court's
decision raised antitrust concerns and undermined the purpose of the
Copyright Act.
The MAI Systems court reached a flawed decision that threatens the
Copyright Act's adaptability to changing technologies. To maintain
flexibility, courts must consider the Copyright Act as a whole in light of
common practices in the industry. By evaluating infringement claims
involving licensing agreements and third parties urder section 117 and
section 107 respectively, courts can adhere to the Copyright Act's
underlying principles and ensure the promotion of progress in art and
science.

178. See Tapp & Wanat, supranote 53, at 258.
179. Id.
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